Aug. 13, 2007 – 8:47 p.m.
Homeland Security Inspector General Richard L. Skinner says the department’s National Bio-Surveillance Integration System has suffered from a lack of direction and funding, insufficient staff and poor communication between management and contractors.
“The NBIS program has not had the sustained leadership and priority needed to ensure continued progress toward achieving bio-surveillance systems integration goals,” said an IG’s report, released Monday. “Although the program began with a clear mandate, strong support, and a strategy for accomplishing the presidential direction, for various reasons NBIS ownership has shifted among department organizations numerous times, with corresponding fluctuations in the program approach, priority and accomplishments.”
“In addition, NBIS has struggled in its inception to secure the staff needed to manage program activities effectively,” the report said.
Among the problems found in the report was NBIS’ lack of a full-time program manager for the first two years of its development. Before that, the system had a part-time supervisor, unfamiliar with DHS processes and lacking in hiring authority. NBIS then went through four managers in three years because of changes in agency ownership. It also lacked key staff members, including public health officials and representatives to work with the intelligence community.
The report comes at the same time as a House Energy and Commerce Committee investigation into the management and operation of NBIS. On Aug. 7, committee Chairman
“The IG’s report documents bureaucratic muddle at its worst,” he said. “We didn’t realize what an understatement it was when NBIS told us its system was not operational. . . . More than three years after the president announced the creation of NBIS, it still has no permanent director or staff, and its computer system is still under development. This does not appear to be a functional operation.”
Energy and Commerce has said it does not have plans for a hearing, but one might eventually be held.
In response to the inspector general’s report, DHS spokesman Russ Knocke said NBIS still has “more distance to go,” but has made improvements such as defining goals and securing analytic and technical support from six federal agencies.
“Relative to the Inspector General’s report . . . the department was already addressing several of the items raised by the IG at the time of its investigation,” Knocke said. “Most importantly, the program now has critical leadership and support from senior officials. We are in the process of hiring nine full-time employees dedicated just to this program. There are seven employees working there now. That includes two full time employees and five U.S. Public Health officers.”
Skinner’s report, which was based on observation, staff interviews, and relevant documents, said the impetus for NBIS’ creation came from Homeland Security Presidential directives 9 and 10, which President Bush issued in 2004.
The orders called for improved cross-federal efforts to develop biological threat awareness and an early warning system to assist the government with recognizing and responding to biological attacks on humans, animals, food, water, agriculture and environmental resources. In response, DHS created NBIS to bring together bio-surveillance data from various agencies and systems that monitor biological threats, both natural and intentional.
The inspector general’s report says NBIS’s development started strong, then faltered. According to the time frame presented in the report:
• In early 2004, DHS began work on NBIS, in response to President Bush’s directives. The initial system design work went to DHS’ Science and Technology Directorate, which made “good first steps.” With no funds appropriated for the program by July, S&T used $1.686 million of its budget for the initial architecture design study and began coordinating meetings with interagency representatives.
• NBIS lost momentum when it was transferred to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate in January of 2005. The program was given limited office space, so the program manager had trouble bringing on staff. Additionally, while the manager suggested a sole-source contract to hasten the development of an information technology system, DHS opted for competitive bidding.
• IAIP awarded a $123,000 contract for “NBIS Lite,” a prototype database. With its limited capability, NBIS Lite was later abandoned in favor of the full-scale system, “NBIS 2.0.”
• At a November 2005 speech, President Bush discussed various initiatives, including NBIS. Program officials said that, prior to the speech, they did not know NBIS was a priority. Support in the form of contract personnel and office space followed the speech.
• By late 2005, NBIS made some developmental process but faced roadblocks such as a new contracting officer appointed in early 2006, who delayed NBIS 2.0 contracting by months. Despite that and a new contract vehicle that caused further delays, the $14.3 million NBIS 2.0 contract was awarded to Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) in September 2006.
• After the contract award, DHS moved NBIS again, this time to the Office of the Chief Medical Officer. NBIS benefitted from increased senior level support under OCMO and received greater visibility when the agency was integrated into the Office of Health Affairs.
Despite the advantages of the move to OCMO, Skinner’s report said NBIS still lacks a plan for managing its system development, milestones needed to track accomplishment, a concept of operations, and needed employees, such as an expert in biological threats and defense.
Because of inadequate guidance, SAIC has made limited progress in its NBIS 2.0 development and could only provide “generic, analytical reports” at an NBIS 2.0 demonstration in January 2007, the report said.
Skinner recommended that NBIS assess its staffing needs, develop and implement milestones, create a concept of operations and a plan for outreach and communications with other agencies and catalog the information it needs to become operational.
In a response attached to Skinner’s report, DHS Chief Medical Officer Jeffrey W. Runge agreed with the recommendation, but included information intended to address specific concerns in the report and provide reasons for some of the setbacks to NBIS.
Rob Margetta can be reached at rmargetta@cq.com.