CQ WEEKLY – COVER STORY
Sept. 22, 2012 – 12:35 p.m.
Old Policies for an Angry Era in the Middle East
By Jonathan Broder, CQ Staff
With anti-American riots spreading across the Arab world in protest over an anti-Islam video, the voices of outrage on Capitol Hill are rising. Several lawmakers have called for a punitive cut-off of aid to several post-revolution Arab governments for their failure to protect U.S. diplomats, four of whom were killed in Benghazi, Libya.
![]() |
||
|
“I want to know if any of it is going to Libya or Egypt,” Indiana Republican Rep.
Last week, the Senate was effectively stalled by Kentucky Republican
“We should not disengage from our relationship with these countries, so I would not support eliminating aid,” says New Hampshire Republican
The gap between rhetoric and congressional action highlighted several fundamental truths about U.S. policy toward the broader Arab world following popular revolutions that have seen Islamic governments take power in Egypt and Tunisia and populist regimes emerge in Libya and Yemen. Aid to these governments continues because, ultimately, the money provides Washington with its only real leverage there — even if that leverage is far more limited than supporters on Capitol Hill would like to believe. On the flip side, boosting the aid would not buy additional cooperation from Arab governments already under pressure from spreading anti-American protests. Meanwhile, the continued provision of $3.1 billion to a prosperous Israel underscores a special relationship between Washington and Jerusalem that has become as controversial in the Arab world as it is politically untouchable in Congress.
In other words, despite deep misgivings about the new Islamic governments that have emerged from the Arab Spring and the directions they might be heading, U.S. policy toward the Arab world is locked in — no matter who wins the White House and Congress in November.
“We have a lot at stake in the Middle East, and you don’t dramatically change policy with so much on the line because change is extremely costly,” says Shibley Telhami, a Middle East expert at the University of Maryland and the Brookings Institution.
Obama administration officials argue that a continuity of policy is more important than ever in the post-revolution Arab world. U.S. aid, they say, will help ease the democratic development of the new governments and hopefully soften popular resentment toward the United States, forged from decades of Washington’s support for recently ousted authoritarian rulers.
“Democratic transitions are under way” in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, White House press secretary Jay Carney declared last week. “Our policy is geared toward supporting that transition in a way that enhances their prospects of democracy in the region and enhances the prospects that the countries in the region either will continue to be — or will grow to be — supportive of the United States and our interests.”
Echoing that approach was none other than House Majority Leader
To a certain degree, Arab governments are also locked into their relationship with the United States. The new Egyptian government of President Mohammed Morsi, for example, desperately needs the combined $2.5 billion in aid and debt relief that Washington offers. And Persian Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia still count on the United States to protect them against their biggest rival, Iran.
But there is a new factor in the region that has not been present before: ordinary Arabs whose voices were suppressed for decades under U.S.-backed authoritarian rulers. Unleashed by their revolutions, they are now expressing not only their offense over the anti-Islam film, but also pent-up resentment over years of U.S. policies, including Washington’s longtime backing of the dictators that used to rule them, unwavering U.S. support for Israel, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and what many Arabs see as a broader Western war against Islam. Under these circumstances, both the United States and the region’s new rulers will be walking a tightrope as they try to maintain some semblance of their countries’ longstanding relationships.
Old Policies for an Angry Era in the Middle East
“There is diminished tolerance for American policies in these countries,” says Charles W. Freeman Jr., a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia. “And increasingly, these countries are going to do things that they see in their own interests without much regard for ours.”
Decades of Aid
![]() |
||
|
The modern era of American aid policy toward the Middle East goes back to the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The United States pledged to underwrite that agreement, and every year since then, Congress has provided roughly $3 billion for Israel and $2 billion for Egypt, although the totals have varied depending on economic and security conditions. To date, the two countries remain the largest recipients of U.S. aid.
Smaller amounts of military assistance have gone to Yemen in recent years, mostly to equip the country’s armed forces against al Qaeda militants and tribal insurgents. Last year, Congress also provided small sums to post-revolution Libya, largely to finance pro-democracy groups helping the country build a civil society.
But it is the billions of dollars in aid to Egypt that underscore why U.S. policy toward that country is so hard to change. “Egypt is the largest, most powerful Arab country in the region,” says California Democrat
The aid to Egypt comes mostly in the form of military assistance. The money circulates back into the U.S. economy with Egypt’s purchase of American-made war planes, cargo aircraft, helicopters, naval vessels, tanks, artillery and small arms to modernize its Soviet-supplied military. In addition to serving as a dependable customer for U.S. defense companies, Egypt has served as a close ally in the region, providing overflight rights and transit facilities for U.S. forces, expedited passage for U.S. warships through the Suez Canal and intelligence cooperation in President George W. Bush’s “war on terrorism.”
Upon taking office, President Obama sought to improve U.S. relations with the Arab world and traveled to Cairo in 2009 to deliver a major speech that called for a new era of good will between Muslims and Americans. Although he and the rest of America were caught off guard by the revolutions that swept the Arab world in 2011, Obama eventually supported the rebels who overthrew Egypt’s longtime President Hosni Mubarak in February of that year.
But tensions flared between Washington and Cairo in February when the country’s transitional leaders cracked down on U.S.-financed pro-democracy groups and imprisoned several Americans, including the son of Transportation Secretary
Congress threatened to cut off aid to Egypt if the Americans weren’t set free. Eventually, the Egyptians released them. But in the fiscal 2012 omnibus spending bill, infuriated lawmakers slapped stringent conditions on aid that was already approved but not yet distributed. Those conditions included a requirement that the administration demonstrate that Egypt was taking specific steps toward democracy. Exercising a national security waiver in March, Secretary of State
Egypt Is Foremost
![]() |
||
|
On Capitol Hill, misgivings about Egypt only grew when Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, won the country’s presidential election in June. Lawmakers expressed concerns about the Brotherhood’s anti-Western views, its possible support for terrorism and a move by Egypt’s new leader to abandon the peace treaty with Israel.
Old Policies for an Angry Era in the Middle East
Such fears have proven unfounded so far. Morsi says he seeks good relations with the United States. He also has vowed to honor all of Egypt’s treaties and international obligations and has worked closely with Israel to crack down on Islamic militants operating in the Sinai Peninsula along their shared border.
But Morsi has disappointed Washington in other ways. In August, he made his first trip outside the Arab world as president to China instead of the United States. Earlier this month, against American wishes, he attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran. He also has launched his own diplomatic initiative to resolve the civil war in Syria that includes Iran and Turkey.
What is clear is that Morsi is no longer following the script that Washington wrote for his predecessor.
“There continues to be an odd cognitive dissonance affecting much of Washington when it comes to Egypt,” says Steven A. Cook, an expert on Egypt at the Council on Foreign Relations. “There is recognition of the major changes that have occurred since February 2011, but there is a desire to do business pretty much as usual. The problem is that business pretty much as usual was based on a deal with authoritarians who agreed to carry Washington’s water.”
Morsi, Cook says, faces “a more complex and multilayered challenge” as a democratically elected president, where local politics now matter as much as international relations.
That challenge surfaced this month when angry mobs in Egypt and Benghazi attacked U.S. diplomatic missions in reaction to the anti-Islam video, which had been made in California and posted on YouTube. Militants apparently took advantage of the chaos at the U.S. consulate in Benghazi to launch an attack that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other U.S. personnel. The Egyptian riot was not deadly, but the mob stormed the U.S. Embassy compound, tore down the American flag, burned it and raised in its place the black banner of militant Islam.
Officials of the new Libyan government lost no time in apologizing profusely for the deadly violence in Benghazi. But Morsi remained silent for two days after the attacks. When he finally spoke out, the Egyptian leader was equivocal, condemning the violence but also the video. “All of us Egyptians reject any form of attack or insult to the Prophet,” Morsi said, as he offered his condolences over the deaths of the Americans. He then called for peaceful protests against the video on Friday, Sept. 14, in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, underscoring his need to strike a balance between the United States and his own devoutly Muslim public.
“Americans consistently fail to recognize that Arabs have their own politics and the ability to calculate their own interests independently of what Washington demands,” Cook wrote in a Sept. 18 commentary on the Council’s website. In post-revolution Egypt, “whenever a crisis erupts that presents Egyptian leaders with a choice of kowtowing to Washington or protecting their political position at home, domestic politics will win virtually every time.”
Nonetheless, many lawmakers remain incensed over Morsi’s reaction. Iowa Republican Sen.
South Carolina Republican Sen.
But such sentiments are in the minority. So far, the United States is on track to deliver the usual $1.55 billion in aid for Egypt in fiscal 2013 — $1.3 billion in military assistance and $250 million in economic aid. The continuing resolution, which provides six months’ worth of that aid, has strong bipartisan support in the Senate. Meanwhile, the administration is working on another agreement on Egypt aid — another $1 billion in U.S. debt relief — that would be paid for with money appropriated in previous years.
“We continue to work closely with the Hill on ways to support a stable, democratic transition in Egypt, which is important for defeating extremism of the kind we saw last week,” State Department spokesman Peter Velasco says. “We provide assistance to Egypt because it’s in our interest to help them to advance regional security and uphold their treaty with Israel and transition to democracy.”
The Israel Factor
Old Policies for an Angry Era in the Middle East
![]() |
||
|
The other main reason why policy toward the Middle East is unlikely to change is, of course, the centrality of U.S. relations with Israel. Ever since 1948, when President Harry S. Truman recognized the infant Jewish state against the counsel of his State Department advisers, support for Israel and its security has formed one of the key pillars of U.S. policy toward the region — and one of its thorniest problems with Arab allies.
So far, the United States has provided Israel with a total of $115 billion in aid, mostly in the form of military assistance, according to the Congressional Research Service. The strong bipartisan support that Israel enjoys on Capitol Hill has provided it with benefits no other country receives. For example, while other countries must spend their military aid in the United States, Israel can use a portion of its military aid to buy weapons from its own manufacturers. On top of its State Department-administered aid, Israel also receives additional money for joint U.S.-Israel missile defense programs from annual defense appropriations bills. And while other countries receive their aid in monthly installments, Israel receives all of its assistance within the first 30 days of the fiscal year, CRS says.
In 2007, Bush agreed to provide Israel with $30 billion in aid over the next 10 years, or roughly $3 billion per year. The six-month fiscal 2013 government-wide appropriations bill contains not only the full amount of the administration’s request of $3.1 billion for Israel, but an additional $100 billion for joint missile defense. Further affecting the aid picture is legislation that Congress passed in June that would expand satellite intelligence-sharing between the two countries, allow the Israeli Air Force to conduct exercises over U.S. airspace and offer Israel greater access to U.S. weapons and materiel stockpiled there.
In addition, the United States has deployed to Israel its state-of-the-art X-band radar system, which allows detection of incoming missiles from great distances. The radar is also connected to the U.S. global missile detection system.
Despite such assistance and U.S. pledges to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, Obama is locked in an increasingly bitter battle with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who wants him to draw lines for Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program that would trigger U.S. military action if Tehran were to cross them. In the process, Netanyahu has publicly questioned Obama’s commitment to Israel security.
Netanayhu’s comments — and what many here see as overt interference in the upcoming presidential election — have drawn sharp criticism from a few lawmakers.
“I’m stunned by the remarks you make this week regarding U.S. support for Israel,” California Democrat
Challenge to U.S. Policy
For many Arabs, such one-upmanship over U.S. support for Israel only underscores what’s wrong with U.S. policy toward the Middle East. In Washington’s determination to safeguard Israel’s security, many Arabs feel, the United States has allowed Israel to grow so strong that it no longer fears any consequence from the absence of any peace agreement with the Palestinians or major repercussions from punishing military actions such as its 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon and its 2008 assault on Gaza. Meanwhile, about 300,000 Israelis now live in the West Bank and Jewish settlement construction continues.
There was a time when the United States was able to use its good relations with both Israelis and Arabs to bridge their differences. In the years after the 1973 Middle East war, the United States scored major diplomatic successes, including three disengagement agreements, the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, and the 1991 Madrid peace conference that brought together Israeli and Palestinian officials for the first time. But all subsequent efforts toward a peace between Israel and the Palestinians have failed, tarnishing Washington’s image as an honest broker in Arab eyes.
Today, U.S. policy toward the Israel- Palestine conflict appears to consist of nothing more than rhetoric about Washington’s commitment to a two-state solution. Early on, Obama tried to persuade Israel to halt all Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank as a way to revive peace talks, but he backed down in the face of opposition, unwilling to risk a fight with Israel — and its powerful supporters in the United States — during his first term. Many Middle East experts predict that if Obama is re-elected, he will be so busy dealing with the domestic economy that he is unlikely to launch a new peace effort in the region.
“Besides, it can’t be revived at this point because there’s no basis for a two-state solution any more,” Freeman says. “The land has all been taken by settlers, who dominate Israeli politics and who aren’t moving.”
Old Policies for an Angry Era in the Middle East
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney revealed his thinking about pursuing an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement at a gathering of wealthy donors in Florida. His remarks were caught on video and released last week by the liberal magazine Mother Jones.
“I look at the Palestinians not wanting to see peace anyway, for political purposes, committed to the destruction and elimination of Israel, and these thorny issues, and I say, ‘There’s just no way,’ ” Romney said. “All right, we have a potentially volatile situation but we sort of live with it, and we kick the ball down the field and hope that ultimately, somehow, something will happen and resolve it.”
So, it’s difficult to see much movement on Middle East peace no matter who wins the election. Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, aid to Israel is virtually guaranteed to continue flowing. Last week, a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee held a hearing titled “Safeguarding Israel’s Security in a Volatile Region,” where former officials and scholars — all strong supporters of the Jewish state — testified about the need for even closer U.S.-Israel security cooperation.
In the absence of movement on the Palestinian issue and amid the fallout of other U.S. policies in region, relations with some of America’s closest remaining Arab allies are also suffering.
Saudi Arabia, another pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East, has been steadily distancing itself from Washington. For example, the longstanding bargain under which Saudi Arabia provided oil to the United States at lower-than-market prices in exchange for American protection has frayed. In December 2002, when the Saudis realized Bush was going to invade Iraq over their objections, they dropped their subsidy to the United States, and within four months, China was Riyadh’s largest customer.
The United States used to enjoy broad overflight rights in Saudi airspace for U.S. military aircraft traveling to Iraq and Afghanistan, but no longer. Now, U.S. military officials must request overflight permission on a flight-by-flight basis. And autocratic Saudi Arabia became even more wary of the United States after watching how quickly Washington decided to turn against longtime ally Mubarak in Egypt and side with the protesters.
As for Egypt and other post-revolution Arab countries, all indications are that U.S. aid will continue to flow to them as well, as their leaders juggle U.S. concerns against the passions on their streets.
“We have a bunch of long-term trends going on, none of which are helpful,” Freeman says. “At some point, we’re going to have rethink some of this. Maybe we actually have to listen to people out there once in a while and fix the Israel-Palestine issue, which everyone agrees is the cornerstone in the arch.” Until then, he says, “I guess we continue muddling along as conditions continue to deteriorate.”
FOR FURTHER READING:
Fiscal 2013 continuing resolution (